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Eighth Circuit Interprets Exclusions
of Tobacco-Related Conditions
Narrowly in Christianson v.
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INTRODUCTION

According to 2001 U.S. Census data, approximately sixty-three
percent of the population receive their health care benefits from employer-sponsored health care plans.1 Recognizing the growing number and economic impact of employee benefit plans, Congress enacted
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
E. Kiernan McGorty, B.S., 2001, Davidson College; M.A., 2004, University of Nebraska; J.D., 2006, University of Nebraska College of Law; Ph.D., expected 2007,
University of Nebraska.
1. See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 264 (2004).
*
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the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act (ERISA)2 in 1974 to
regulate employee pension benefit plans and employee welfare benefit
plans, which include employer-sponsored health care plans. According to ERISA section 2(b), one of the Act's purposes is to protect the
interests of heath care plan participants and beneficiaries by requiring the disclosure of information regarding the plan and providing ad3
equate remedies for breaches of the plan.
Recently the Eighth Circuit, relying in part on section 2(b)'s stated
purpose of protecting plan participants, affirmed a district court's
summary judgment against a health plan in Christianson v. PolyAmerica Med. Benefit Plan.4 The health plan excluded coverage for
conditions related to tobacco use. The Eighth Circuit found that, despite the plan participant's tobacco use, his deep-vein thrombosis was
5
not sufficiently "related to" his condition under the plan language.
However, despite section 2(b)'s directive, to protect plan participants, the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's preemption
scheme has allowed self-insured plans to protect themselves against
state laws regulating the substantive content of health plans.6 Therefore, many plans are free to completely exclude coverage to groups of
individuals or for particular illnesses. Court decisions adverse to
plans, such as Christianson,may spur self-insured plans to eliminate
coverage completely for certain groups and illnesses rather than to
carve out exclusions to general coverage. In addition, plan administrators' decisions are reviewed by courts under an abuse-of-discretion
standard, and the most substantial costs plan sponsors could face for
wrongfully denying benefits are the costs of the benefits plus attorneys' fees, court costs, and prejudgment interest. The legal system
clearly favors health plans over plan participants and beneficiaries.7
2. Employee Retirement Income Securities Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
4. Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 412 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2005), affg
288 F. Supp. 2d 991 (D. Minn. 2003).
5. Id. at 939.
6. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Donald T. Bogan, ERISA:
State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693
(2005). The primary purpose of ERISA's broad preemptive scheme is the uniform
regulation of employee benefits plans. Deborah S. Davidson, Note, Balancing the
Interests of State Health CareReform and Uniform Employee Benefit Laws Under
ERISA: A "Uniform Patient ProtectionAct," 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.

203 (1998). Although plan sponsors, administrators, and participants all benefit
from standardized regulations, ERISA's preemption scheme has made it difficult
for states to address local health care problems. Id.
7. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker,
J., concurring); see also Curtis D. Rooney, The States, Congress, or the Courts:
Who Will be First to Reform ERISA Remedies?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73 (1998).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:526

In Part II, this Note begins with a brief discussion about how
ERISA preemption and civil enforcement favor plans over participants. This Note then explains the Christianson decision in Part III,
detailing the facts surrounding the case and describing Christianson's
victory. The Eighth Circuit held that Poly-America's exclusion of tobacco-related conditions did not apply to Christianson's deep-vein
thrombosis despite his tobacco use. Section IV.A discusses reasons
why employers may target smoking and ways they will try to exclude
smoking-related illnesses from health plans. Employers are not required to offer their employees health coverage, and employers will
only be able to keep their plans operating if they are able to control
their exposure to rising health care costs. Employers have begun to
attempt to save money by limiting the coverage they provide to employees who engage in voluntary, risk-taking behavior such as smoking. Section IV.B demonstrates that, despite these efforts, employers
may have a difficult time enforcing these restrictions. This Note concludes by noting that although individual smokers may have a few
successes in winning benefits from their health plans, these successes
will only encourage health plans to eliminate smokers as a group from
any health care coverage. Although ERISA permits the exclusion of
tobacco-related conditions from plan coverage, plan administrators
will find it too difficult to carry out such exclusions and ultimately will
be forced to terminate coverage for smokers altogether.
II.
A.

ERISA BACKGROUND

ERISA Preemption and Civil Enforcement
1.

ERISA Preemption

Congress enacted ERISA to promote and protect the interests of
participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans. 8 In order to
provide plan participants and beneficiaries ready access to the federal
courts and appropriate remedies, 9 ERISA delineated an expansive
preemption provision in section 514(a),1o which essentially provides
that any and all state laws relating to any employee benefit plan are
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 1144(a). Ordinarily, federal preemption is a federal defense to a plaintiffs
claim. According to the well-pleaded-complaint rule, a federal question has to
appear on the face of a complaint for the defendant to remove a case filed in state
court to federal court under federal question jurisdiction. However, when Congress has so completely preempted a particular area of law, any complaint raising
a claim in that area of law is necessarily federal in character. Congress has
clearly expressed its intent that ERISA civil enforcement claims are federal questions. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1987).
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preempted by ERISA.11 The "savings clause" found in section
514(b)(2)(A) saves any state law that regulates insurance from preemption. 12 The "deemer clause," under section 514(b)(2)(B), prohibits
self-insured plans from being deemed insurance companies that are
subject to state insurance laws.13 Thus insured health care plans are
subject to state laws regulating insurance, whereas self-insured plans
are exempt from those same state laws. 14 As a result, plans have a
strong incentive to become self-insured-freedom from state regulation. The Supreme Court has given ERISA broad preemptive force
through its interpretations of the scope of section 514.15 According to
critics, ERISA generally, and section 514(a) specifically, have become
"virtually impenetrable shields that insulate plan sponsors from any
meaningful liability for negligent or malfeasant acts committed
against plan beneficiaries," and the Supreme Court has created "a
'regulatory vacuum' in which virtually all state law remedies are pre16
empted but very few federal substitutes are provided."
2.

Civil Enforcement

Under ERISA, the doctrine of complete preemption requires that
the state law claim must not only be preempted by section 514(a) but
also that a substitute federal claim must exist under section 502(a) to
remove a plaintiff's case to federal court.1 7 ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B), ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism, allows health
11. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995) (creating a rebuttable presumption against preemption of traditional areas of state law regulation); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (establishing that a state law "relates to" employee
benefit plans if the state law has a "connection with" employee benefit plans or
has a "reference to" employee benefit plans).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000); see also, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 41.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000).
14. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985). An "insured" health care plan purchases
health care insurance and provides benefits to its participants and beneficiaries
through this insurance, whereas a "self-insured" plan collects funds from the employer, employees, or both, and provides benefits to its participants and beneficiaries from this fund. See Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation:
A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?,65 TENN.
L. REV. 485, 491-92 (1998).
15. See Lorraine Schmall & Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption:A Move Towards
Defederalizing Claimsfor Patients'Rights, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 529 (2004); David L.
Trueman, Will the Supreme Court Finally Eliminate ERISA Preemption?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 427 (2004).

16. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring); see also Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in
ERISA: Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 Am.J. TAX POL'v 47, 48 (1988)
(arguing that ERISA's "semi-preemption" of state law creates questions which
cannot be resolved).
17. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
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care plan participants and beneficiaries to bring civil actions against
their plan administrators. These civil actions can be brought to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan, to enforce rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.1 8 ERISA section 502(a)(3) limits the relief available; the court can enjoin the HMO from continuing to deny benefits or
give other appropriate equitable relief,' 9 which does not include monetary damages. 20 Therefore, section 502 only allows plan participants
and beneficiaries to seek the benefits they were contractually entitled
to in the first place. 2 1 The participants or beneficiaries also can be2
2
awarded attorneys' fees and court costs under section 502(g)(1).
Some circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, allow participants or ben23
eficiaries to recover prejudgment interest on denied benefits.
Because the greatest cost a plan would face if a court ultimately
finds that the benefits should not have been denied is simply the costs
of the benefits, attorneys' fees, court costs, and prejudgment interest,
the plan administrator has strong incentives to deny claims. Therefore, "[a]ny rational [plan administrator] will recognize that if it acts
in good faith, it will pay for far more procedures than if it acts otherwise."24 This scheme creates the disagreeable effect that the most
profitable plans are those that deny claims most frequently. 25
If a plan administrator denies a claim for benefits under ERISA
section 503, the plan administrator must provide the plan participant
or beneficiary with adequate notice in writing, "setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant."2 6 ERISA section 503 also requires that
health care plans establish a reasonable procedure to review participants' and beneficiaries' appeals of denied benefits. 2 7 Research indicates that U.S. health plans process approximately 250,000 appeals
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
19. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
20. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134 (1985).
21. Due to ERISA's broad preemptive power under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), the Act's contractual remedy preempts state tort remedies for medical malpractice against
plans, eliminating the possible recovery of compensatory, panitive, or wrongfuldeath damages regardless of a plan's malfeasance. See, e.g., Davila, 542 U.S. at
204.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2000).
23. See, e.g., Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322 (8th Cir. 1995).
24. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2003).
25. Id. at 459.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (2000).
27. Id. § 1133(2).
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annually. 28 Most plans require that a plan participant or beneficiary
must exhaust the plan's internal appeal procedures before they can
seek external review mechanisms. 29 It is imperative that plan participants and beneficiaries understand the internal review process for
two reasons. First, courts may dismiss claims with prejudice due to
failure to exhaust the plan's administrative appeal procedure. 30 Second, judges are generally limited to reviewing the documents that the
plan administrators had before them at the time of the benefit
3
denial. 1
B.

Standard of Judicial Review

In the landmark Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch3 2 decision,
the Supreme Court held that where an employee benefits plan gives
the administrator discretion to make eligibility determinations, a
court should only reverse the administrator's determination if there
has been an abuse of discretion. 33 As a result of this decision, nearly
all plans include language that gives the plan administrator "discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan."3 4 Courts have made it easy for plans to invoke
the abuse-of-discretion standard because courts do not want to inter35
fere with the administration of the plan benefits.
The court will use a less deferential standard of review if a plaintiff
can present material and probative evidence that a palpable conflict of
interest or a serious procedural irregularity was tied to the denial of
benefits and caused a serious breach of the plan administrator's fiduciary duty. 3 6 The evidence must give the court serious concern that
37
the plan's eligibility determination was arbitrary and capricious.
However, once a plaintiff is entitled to a less deferential standard of
review, courts recognize that the plaintiff more than likely has sufficient evidence to prove that the plan administrator's decision was ar38
bitrary and capricious.
28. Carole Roan Gresenz et al., Patients in Conflict with Managed Care:A Profile of
Appeals in Two HMOs, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 189, 191.
29. Id. at 189-90.
30. See, e.g., Norris v. Citibank, N.A. Disability Plan, 308 F.3d 880, 884 (8th Cir.
2002); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1252 (8th Cir. 1998).
31. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 115.
34. Id.
35. See Layes, 132 F.3d at 1250.
36. Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1998).
37. Layes, 132 F.3d at 1250.
38. Barnhart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 179 F.3d 583, 588 n.9 (8th Cir. 1999).
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Coverage Exclusions

ERISA section 102(a) requires that plan administrators provide
plan participants and beneficiaries with a summary description of the
employee health plan. 3 9 The summary plan description typically explains, in three main sections, what benefits will be covered.4 0 The
first section, often referred to as coverage categories, identifies the
broad categories of services that the plan will cover (e.g., inpatient
hospital services and maternal care). The second section, "coverage
stipulations," explains whether participants will have to share any of
the costs of the services and how long they can utilize the services.
The third section, often referred to as coverage criteria, attempts to
distinguish between the particular services that will be covered within
a coverage category and those services that will not be covered.
Within their coverage criteria, summary plan descriptions often include exclusions (i.e., care the plan will not cover). Christianson involved a tobacco-related conditions exclusion and appears to be the
only case in which a plan participant or beneficiary has challenged the
application of this exclusion.
III.

CHRISTIANSON V. POLY-AMERICA MEDICAL
BENEFIT PLAN

A.

Facts and Background

Richard Christianson worked for Up North Plastics in Minnesota,
a subsidiary of Poly-America, Inc., and had health care coverage
through Poly-America's Medical Benefit Plan.41 Christianson's job required him to stand on a concrete floor for over fifty hours a week,
with very little walking. 42 On January 18, 2001, Christianson visited
his primary physician, complaining of painful swelling in his left leg.43
Christianson's primary physician sent him to Regina Hospital for an
ultrasound.44 The ultrasound revealed that Christianson suffered
from deep-vein thrombosis of the lower leg.45 Deep-vein thrombosis is
the development of a blood clot in the deep veins of the body.46 The
legs are particularly vulnerable to blood clots because blood stops or
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2000).
40. David M. Eddy, Benefit Language: CriteriaThat Will Improve Quality While Reducing Costs, 275 JAMA 650, 650 (1996).
41. Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 412 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 2005).
42. Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 991, 992 (D. Minn.
2003).
43. Id. at 992.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. WebMD Health, Deep Vein Thrombosis, http://my.webmd.com/hw/heart-disease/
aa68137.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
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slows down in this part of the body.47 The most significant danger
posed by deep-vein thrombosis is that the blood clot will break loose
and travel to the brain or lungs.48 Risk factors for deep-vein thrombosis include, among other things, restricted mobility, genetic coagulation disorders, obesity, and smoking. 49
Dr. Georgia Taggart admitted Christianson to United Hospital for
treatment and noted that Christianson was a healthy, forty-six-yearold man with minimal risk factors for deep-vein thrombosis other than
prolonged standing and tobacco abuse.50 She requested that Christianson be tested for the factor V Leiden mutation, the most common
genetic cause of deep-vein thrombosis, which suggests that Dr. Taggart did not believe Christianson's smoking caused his deep-vein
thrombosis.51 Christianson underwent a left-leg thrombolysis and six
days of lytic therapy to break up the blood clot.52 Dr. Charles Terzian
treated Christianson at the hospital, giving him a primary diagnosis
53
of deep-vein thrombosis and a secondary diagnosis of tobacco abuse.
He noted that Christianson had no risk factors for deep-vein
thrombosis.54
Christianson submitted his medical bills for nearly $50,000 to
Poly-America's medical benefit plan. 55 The plan included language
that gave the plan administrator discretion to make coverage determinations and included the following plan provision: "Charges related in
any way, shape or form to, or complicated by, the use of tobacco products or for treatment of an ailment or condition associated with the
use of tobacco [are excluded from coverage]."56 On June 1, 2001, the
plan administrator sent Christianson a letter denying coverage for his
hospital bills based on Poly-America's determination that his medical
expenses were related to smoking. 5 7 In accordance with plan appeal
58
procedures, Christianson requested a review of the coverage denial.
On June 30, 2001, he wrote,
My doctors have assured me that while occasional tobacco use may be a risk
factor for [deep-vein thrombosis] it is impossible to determine if it had an impact in this instance .... There is no way to determine one way or the other if
47. Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
48. Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 412 F.3d 935, 937 n.3 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citing Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2004)).
49. Id.; Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
50. Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 412 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 2005);
Christianson, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
56. Christianson, 412 F.3d at 937; Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 992-93.
57. Christianson, 412 F.3d at 937; Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
58. Christianson, 412 F.3d at 937; Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
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smoking was a factor and so I feel it is unconscionable for Poly-America, my
long term employer, to deny coverage. 5 9

Poly-America revisited its decision, requesting the medical opinion
of Dr. Jerry Gurkoff, an osteopath and orthopedic surgeon not affiliated with Poly-America.60 Dr. Gurkoff reviewed Christianson's medical records, and without evaluating Christianson himself, concluded
that Christianson's deep-vein thrombosis fell within the tobacco-related conditions exclusion of Poly-America's health plan. 6 1 Based on
Dr. Gurkoffs opinion and Christianson's medical records, PolyAmerica again determined that Christianson's hospitalization would
not be covered. 6 2 Poly-America sent Christianson a letter confirming
the original denial, explaining that Christianson's medical records indicated that his condition was related to his tobacco abuse and that an
63
independent doctor came to the same conclusion.
After this second denial, Christianson sent Poly-America letters
from two physicians, Dr. Robyn Oliver and Dr. Terzian.64 Both physicians treated Christianson in the hospital for his deep-vein thrombosis, and their letters explained that they had not determined that
Christianson's condition was related to or caused by smoking. In Dr.
Oliver's opinion, Christianson's deep-vein thrombosis was of unknown
origin; in Dr. Terzian's opinion, nothing in Christianson's medical
records indicated that his condition was related to his tobacco use. 65
66
Poly-America did not respond to these submissions.
Christianson filed a suit against Poly-America under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) in the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota. 6 7 During a preliminary hearing, the district court sought
Poly-America's interpretation of the phrase "related to." The court
posed a hypothetical to Poly-America, asking how the plan would de68
Polytermine when lung cancer is "related to" tobacco use.
America's attorney interpreted the tobacco-related conditions exclusion as requiring the plan "to show a direct link between a particular
beneficiary's problem and their use of tobacco."69 As a result, the district court found that Poly-America conceded that a direct link be59. Christianson, 412 F.3d at 937.
60. Id. at 938; Christianson, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
61. Christianson,412 F.3d at 938. Dr. Gurkoff initially provided his opinion to PolyAmerica via phone, but after Poly-America denied Christianson coverage a second time, Dr. Gurkoff submitted his formal opinion in writing. Id.
62, Id.; Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
63. Christianson,412 F.3d at 938; Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
64. Christianson, 412 F.3d at 938; Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
65. Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
66. Christianson,412 F.3d at 938.
67. Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d 991.
68. Christianson,412 F.3d at 938.
69. Id. The district court also relied on the definition of "related" in Webster's dictionary: "connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation." Chris-
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tween a medical condition and tobacco use must exist for the plan to
0
preclude coverage under the "related to" language of the exclusion.7
The court also found that the appeal procedures for the plan failed
to delineate when an administrative file was closed to additional
materials. 7 1 Therefore, Dr. Oliver and Dr. Terzian's letters were considered part of Christianson's file even though they were submitted
after Poly-America had notified Christianson that they had confirmed
their original denial determination. Because Poly-America failed to
argue that the letters should not be admitted, the court found that
Poly-America waived any objections to the court considering those
72
documents.
Furthermore, the court found that it did not need to determine
whether to deviate from the abuse-of-discretion standard of review be73
cause the outcome would be the same under any standard of review.
Therefore, even under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court
found that barely a scintilla of evidence existed to support a finding
that Christianson's condition was related to his smoking behavior.74
The court acknowledged that smoking is a risk factor for deep-vein
thrombosis but pointed out that risk factors merely increase the likelihood of a medical condition. 75 The court stated that further evidence,
such as competent expert testimony, is needed to show a risk factor is
the cause of a medical condition in a specific case. 76 The district court
granted summary judgment to Christianson and awarded him pastdue benefits, attorneys' fees, prejudgment interest, and costs. 77
tianson, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1916 (3d ed. 1986)).

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.

77.

Id.
Id. at 993 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 994. The court cited Barnhartv. UNUM Life Insurance Co., 179 F.3d 583,
588 n.9 (8th Cir. 1999), for its finding that a plaintiff who satisfies the requirements for a less-deferential standard of review "will more than likely have substantial evidence showing that the fiduciary's decision was arbitrary and
capricious once the sliding scale is invoked to lessen the court's deference for the
administrator's decision." On appeal, Poly-America claimed that the district
court applied a less-than-deferential standard of review, but the Eighth Circuit
rejected that argument. Christianson v. Poly-America Med. Benefit Plan, 412
F.3d 935, 939 n.5 (8th Cir. 2005).
Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 996-97.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 997. Christianson's attorney pointed out that Poly-America appears to have
relied on a faulty syllogism: Some people have deep-vein thrombosis that is related to tobacco abuse. Mr. Christianson is a smoker. Therefore, his deep-vein
thrombosis is related to smoking. The court found that "[t]his sort of flawed
thinking represents exactly the sort of arbitrary and capricious administrative
decision-making that judicial review is designed to unseat." Id.
Id. at 998.
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The Eighth Circuit's Decision

Poly-America appealed the district court's finding, claiming that
the district court erroneously interpreted the policy's "related to" language as requiring a causal link, and erred in considering Dr. Oliver
and Dr. Terzian's medical opinions and in awarding attorneys' fees,
court costs, and prejudgment interest. 78 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's findings, reviewing the grant of summary judgment
de novo and applying the same abuse-of-discretion standard of
79
review.
In response to Poly-America's contention that the district court
constructed its own definition of "related to," the Eighth Circuit responded by pointing out that Poly-America's own counsel acknowledged that the "related to" language requires "a direct link between a
particular beneficiary's problem and their use of tobacco" in response
to the hypothetical posed by the district court.8 0 Poly-America tried to
deny this definition, claiming that its counsel's statement should not
be applied to the present case. 8 1 The Eighth Circuit concluded that
there was no logical reason why the "related to" language would relung cancer but not for a
quire a direct link for a participant who has
82
participant that has deep-vein thrombosis.
The district court found that insufficient evidence existed to support a finding that Christianson's condition was related to his smoking
behavior.8 3 At oral argument, Poly America's counsel even admitted
that it might be impossible to demonstrate a direct link between
smoking and any health condition:8 4 "[H]ow does anybody prove,
given, you know, that tobacco use causes so many disorders that have
so many causal contributing factors, how does anybody prove that to8
bacco use definitely caused a particular episode of an illness." 5
In addition, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it was proper for the
district court to consider Dr. Terzian and Dr. Oliver's medical opinions.8 6 In a footnote in its brief, Poly-America argued that the letters
were not entitled to any weight because they were submitted after
Poly-America had confirmed its decision to deny coverage.8 7 The
court construed Poly-America's argument to be a challenge to the
weight accorded to the opinions, but not to the admissibility of the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Christianson,412 F.3d at 939.
Id. at 939, 941.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (D. Minn.
2003).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Christianson,412 F.3d at 939-40.
Id. at 940.
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opinions.88 The court held that the plan language did not necessarily
prohibit consideration of letters after a denial confirmation.8 9 PolyAmerica pointed out that the plan's sixty-day review process had been
completed two months before the medical opinions were submitted
and that the plan did not allow a second review of coverage denials. 90
However, because the plan accepted Dr. Gurkoffs letter after the confirmation denial, the plan was still open to additional materials. 9 1
Although ERISA gives federal district courts broad discretion to
award reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs to either party for
claims brought under Title I of the Act, the Eighth Circuit no longer
presumes that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and
court costs. 9 2 The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's award of
attorneys' fees, court costs, and prejudgment interest to Christianson, 9 3 citing to authority that a district court's award will not be overturned unless there has been an abuse of discretion.94 In considering
whether to award attorneys' fees and costs, the district court considered the five factors set out in Lawrence v. Westerhaus:
(1) the opposing party's culpability or bad faith;
(2) the opposing party's ability to pay an award of attorney fees and
costs;
(3) the likelihood that the award of attorney fees and costs would deter other persons under similar circumstances;
(4) the likelihood that the cause of action might benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve a significant
legal question regarding ERISA; and
95
(5) the relative merits of the parties' cases.
The district court concluded that Poly-America perpetrated a "serious" breach of its fiduciary duty, Poly-America could afford the attorneys' fees and costs, the award would deter future breaches, the cause
of action benefited all plan participants and beneficiaries by producing
a judicial interpretation of a policy provision, and Christianson's claim
"clearly" had more merit than Poly-America's.96 Poly-America
claimed that if it could no longer exercise discretion in applying its
tobacco-related conditions exclusion, it would be forced to deny cover88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 940 n.6.
Id.
Id.
Martin v. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 299 F.3d 966, 970-72 (8th Cir. 2002)
(overruling Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, 625 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1980)).
Christianson,412 F.3d at 940-41.
Sheehan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 2004).
749 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1984).
Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998 (D. Minn.
2003).
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age to smokers altogether. 9 7 The district court pointed out that this
response would still benefit all plan participants because they would
know that they needed to purchase additional insurance. 98 Because
all the factors weighed in Christianson's favor, the district court
awarded Christianson nearly $20,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. 9 9
Poly-America argued that the district court failed to evaluate the degree of Poly-America's culpability or bad faith, but the Eighth Circuit
held that the district court considered all the relevant factors and did
not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys' fees and costs.' 0 0 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the district court
does not have to consider all five factors in every case.' 0 '
The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the district court's award of prejudgment interest.102 Poly-America argued that because Christianson
never paid the medical bills for his hospitalization, the award of prejudgment interest created a windfall to Christianson to the detriment
of other plan participants and beneficiaries. 1o3 The purpose of awards
for prejudgment interest is not only to provide equitable relief to plan
participants for the financial damages they suffer from improperly denied benefits, but also to deter plan sponsors from reaping financial
benefits by drawing out litigation. 10 4 Otherwise, the wrongdoer would
be unjustly enriched through their use of the withheld benefits and
retention of the interest accumulated during the course of litigation.
The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest in this case because the purpose of the award was satisfied.10 Even though Christianson did not
pay for his medical bills, there is no dispute that Poly-America re0 6
tained the withheld benefits during the dispute.'
IV.

ANALYSIS

Christianson demonstrates the tension between employers' valid
attempts to reduce their exposure to rising health care costs and their
misguided methods for controlling those expenses. According to a survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, employer health insurance premiums grew by eleven
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 998 n.9.
Id.
Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 412 F.3d 935, 941 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.; see also Beatty v. N. Cent. Cos., 282 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2002) (reaching
same conclusion in a prior case).
Christianson,412 F.3d at 941.
Id.
See Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir. 1999); Stroh
Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 752 (8th Cir. 1986).
Christianson,412 F.3d at 941.
Id.
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percent between 2003 and 2004, marking the fourth consecutive year
of double-digit increases. 0 7 The premiums for employer-sponsored
health plans have been increasing at approximately five times the
rate of inflation.10 8 As a consequence, employers are increasingly concerned that they will not have sufficient funds to meet the costs of
their health care plans.10 9 Employers attempt to control their costs in
a variety of ways, such as imposing preexisting condition limitations
and utilization review.110 One clear-cut way to control exposure to
rising health care costs is to incorporate coverage limitations and exclusions in health care plans.
Employers rarely eliminate coverage for a particular illness or condition; instead, they limit certain kinds of treatments, such as cosmetic surgery or experimental procedures."' Nevertheless, there
have been instances where employers have targeted specific conditions. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several employers excluded coverage for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) in their group health insurance plans.11 2 Recently, many employers have begun to focus on smoking as a way to reduce their
health care costs.
Some employers have adopted the position that they should not
have to cover treatment of conditions that are caused by voluntary,
risk-taking behaviors such as smoking.113 In addition, employees who
avoid risky health behaviors may feel that they should not have to pay
higher premiums because other employees who chose to act irresponsibly need costly medical treatments.114 On the other hand, some
have argued that it is morally reprehensible to consider whether an
individual "deserves" his or her medical condition when deciding coverage limitations because it is often difficult to determine the precise
107. Jennifer Barrett Ozols, A Job or a Cigarette?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 2005, http://
msnbc.msn.com/id/7019590/site/newsweek/.
108. Id.
109. Eric C. Sohlgren, Note, Group Health Benefits DiscriminationAgainst AIDS Victims: FallingThrough the Gaps of Federal Law-ERISA, the RehabilitationAct
and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1991).
110. Charles P. Hall, Jr., Designing Medical Care Expense Plans, in 1 THE HANDBOOK
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 189, 189-91 (Jerry S. Rosenbloom ed., 3d ed. 1992); William G. Williams, Medical Care Cost-ContainmentTechniques: An Overview, in 1
THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra.
111. See Zelda Lipton, Supplemental Major Medical and Comprehensive Plans, in 1
THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 110, at 251-53.
112. Sohlgren, supra note 109, at 1247.
113. See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, Voluntary Risks to Health: The Ethical Issues, 243
JAMA 50, 50 (1980) (describing a fire department which does not hire smokers in
an effort to keep health care costs low).
114. See Sharona Hoffman, UnmanagedCare: Towards Moral Fairnessin Health Care
Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 695 (2003).
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cause of an illness and to decide which risk-taking behaviors should be

punished. 115
A.

Reducing Costs by Targeting Smokers

According to the Department of Health and Human Services,
smokers are responsible for eight percent, or $75 billion worth, of the
United States' health care expenditures. 11 6 Health insurance costs
117
are six to twenty-two percent higher for smokers than nonsmokers.
It may seem unfair to target smokers when there are several other
preventable, lifestyle-related illnesses, but there is extensive scientific
literature showing a direct link between smoking and decreased
health."18 Smoking is the leading cause of preventable illnessessuch as lung cancer, emphysema, heart disease, and stroke-in the
United States.119 Smoking not only increases health costs for employers, but smokers are less productive while they are alive and create
lost years of productivity due to premature death.120 According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, smokers cost the United
1 21
States $80 billion in lost productivity.
Because nearly a quarter of the adult population smokes,1 2 2 employers can significantly reduce their health care costs by targeting
smokers. Some states, such as Minnesota, allow employers to charge
smokers higher insurance premiums than nonsmokers as long as the
difference reflects actual increases in cost. 1 23 Employers reason that
115. Id. at 694-96.
116. See Eileen Gunn, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Smokers Need Not Apply, CAREER J., Dec.
14, 2004, http://careerjournal.com/hrcenter/articles/20041214-gunn.html.
117. See Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad
Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940, 954 (1987); Thomas W. Sculco, Note,
Smokers' Rights Legislation: Should the State "Butt Out" of the Workplace?, 33
B.C. L. REV. 879, 883 (1992).

118.

OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 15

(1994).
119. See OFFICE

ON SMOKING & HEALTH., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 38-42 (2000); Ctr. for

Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Annual
Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Economic
Costs-United States, 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 300,

300-01 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5114.pdf.
120. See Dorothy P. Rice et al., The Economic Costs of the Health Effects of Smoking,
1984, 64 MILBANK Q. 489 (1986).
121. Gunn, supra note 116.
122. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 11, 133 (1989).
123. See Jeremy Olson, Smokers May Pay More than a 'Fee': Some Employers Want
Workers Who Smoke to Pick up Partof Health-CareTab, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul,
Minn.), July 18, 2005, at 1A.
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smokers should pay more for health care because they will require
more expensive care over time.
Employers have adopted several techniques for reducing the costs
of smoking. Employers have been able to reduce the prevalence of
smoking and the daily cigarette consumption of their employees by
restricting the places where employees can smoke.1 24 For example,
Lowe's Home Improvement stores do not permit employees or customers to smoke anywhere on their store premises, including the parking
lots.125 Alaska Airlines applicants must pass a nicotine test before
they can be hired.126 Union Pacific began providing prescription coverage for drugs that treat nicotine addiction and offering smoking cessation programs; as a result, the number of employees who smoke
decreased by thirteen percent between 1990 and 2003 and the number
of lifestyle-related health care claims decreased by thirty-five percent
between 1990 and 2001.127 Recently, Union Pacific has implemented
a smoking ban that prohibits smoking on all its property nationwide
and a hiring policy that automatically rejects job applicants that indicate they are smokers, at least in states where such hiring practices
are permitted. 128
Thirty states have "lifestyle" laws that protect smokers against
employment discrimination.12 9 For example, Minnesota enacted a
statute providing that an
employer may not refuse to hire a job applicant or discipline or discharge an
employee because the applicant or employee engages in or has engaged in the
use or enjoyment of lawful consumable products, if the use or enjoyment
takes
13 0
place off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours.

These laws, however, cannot protect many smokers against restricted coverage of tobacco-related conditions. ERISA itself does not
regulate the substantive content of employee welfare plans, 13 1 and because of ERISA's preemption scheme, state insurance laws cannot regulate the substantive content of self-insured plans.13 2 Therefore, an
employer that wishes to eliminate its exposure to certain conditions
124. See Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Policy Levers for the Control of Tobacco Consumption, 90 Ky. L.J. 1009, 1029-30 (2002).
125. Gunn, supra note 116.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Union Pacific estimates it saves $992 for each nonsmoker it hires instead of a
smoker. Olson, supra note 123, at 8A; see also Gunn, supra note 116 (discussing
the Union Pacific ban); Ozols, supra note 107 (same).
129. Olson, supra note 123, at 1A; Ozols, supra note 107; see also Sculco, supra note
117, at 879-80 (analyzing smokers' rights laws).
130. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (West 1993); Robert M. Howie & Laurence A. Shapero, Lifestyle DiscriminationStatutes: A DangerousErosion of At-Will Employment, a Passing Fad, or Both?, 31 EMP. REL. L.J. 21, 24 (2005).
131. Davidson, supra note 6, at 205.
132. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
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needs only to be self-insured and stipulate an exclusion in the plan's
summary plan description. As health care costs continue to rise, employers might start excluding coverage for treatment related to other
voluntary, risk-seeking behavior, such as poor eating habits, alcohol
consumption, and extreme sports. Nevertheless, as Christianson
demonstrates, it is difficult for plans to administer exclusions of coverage for lifestyle-related conditions.
B.

Problems with Administering Exclusions of TobaccoRelated Conditions

Christianson demonstrates the importance of the need for clear
language in plan documents and reasonable administration of plan decisions. Rather than enacting national health care reform, the federal
government has elected to regulate the American health care industry
primarily through informing consumers of their rights and obligations
regarding health care coverage.1 33 By requiring health care insurers
and providers to disclose material information to patients, the federal
government has attempted to increase consumer knowledge while protecting America's commitment to patient autonomy and self34
determination. 1
For employer-sponsored health plans, Congress requires that plan
administrators give plan participants and beneficiaries a summary
plan description of the employee benefit plan. 135 Accordingly, the
summary plan description "shall be written in a manner calculated to
be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the
plan."'136 Plan administrators may have a difficult time drafting summary plan descriptions because the documents must serve two conflicting purposes. 13 7 The need for the summary plan description to
precisely inform plan participants and beneficiaries of their rights and
responsibilities regarding their health care plan implies that it should
be a technical and comprehensive description. However, the summary
plan description also must be comprehensible to plan participants and
beneficiaries, which suggests that it should be free of jargon and be as
concise as possible.
Within Poly-America's summary plan description, the language excluding tobacco-related conditions was expansive: "Charges related in
any way, shape or form to, or complicated by, the use of tobacco prod133. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLuM. L. REV. 1701, 1701-12 (1999).
134. Id.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2000).
136. Id.
137. Eddy, supra note 40, at 653.
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ucts or for treatment of an ailment or condition associated with the
use of tobacco [are excluded from coverage]."138 Poly-America failed
to take advantage of the broader plan language; instead of claiming
Christianson's deep-vein thrombosis was "complicated by" or "associated with" his smoking, Poly-America claimed Christianson's condition was "related to" his smoking.13 9 The district court reasoned that
the clause was so broad that a plan beneficiary did not even need to be
a smoker to be denied coverage under the clause-that is, a nonsmoker with heart disease "undoubtedly" has a condition associated
with smoking.140 Therefore, unlike the "related to" language, the "associated with" language did not require a causal nexus.
At oral argument, the attorney for Poly-America explained that the
plan used this broad language to give it flexibility in benefit determinations. The district court had a harsh response:
The problem with this sort of unfettered discretion, of course, is that it gives
rise to the kind of arbitrary and capricious decision-making forbidden by
ERISA. Moreover, the uncertain application of the exclusion-seemingly antithetical to the sort of planning insurance is designed to facilitate-raises
14 1
questions as to whether the exclusion renders the policy coverage illusory.

The district court, however, did not have to determine if the broad
"associated with" language was invalid, because Poly-America relied
solely on the limited "related to" language of the tobacco-related condition exclusion to deny Christianson coverage. In both denial letters,
the plan administrator explained that the hospitalization was not covered because Christianson's deep-vein thrombosis was related to his
tobacco abuse.
It appears that Poly-America's tobacco-related conditions exclusion
was not going to serve its intended purpose either way. If the plan
administrator had denied Christianson coverage based on the broad
"associated with" language, it is likely that the district court would
138. Christianson v. Poly-Am. Med. Benefit Plan, 412 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original).
139. At oral argument, the attorney for Poly-America claimed that a letter subsequent
to the original denial did rely on the 'associated with" language, but the only
letters in the record relied on the "related to" language. Christianson v. Poly-Am.
Med. Benefit Plan, 288 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995 n.4 (D. Minn. 2003). The court explained that
even were the plan administrator to subsequently invoke the 'associated
with' clause, his obligation through the appeals process is to justify his
initial decision as communicated to the plan participant,not to play a
kind of shell game with the beneficiary in which he invokes different
policy provisions as the appeal proceeds.

Id.
140. Id. at 995 n.3. The court explained how it would have reacted if the plan administrator had relied on the 'complicated by" language. The court's reaction probably would have been similar to its impression of the "associated with" language
because both phrases are broad and appear not to require a causal connection.
141. Id.
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have found the clause invalid and awarded Christianson summary
judgment. Although the district court and the Eighth Circuit did not
question the validity of the "related to" language, they required the
plan to demonstrate a causal nexus between Christianson's smoking
and his condition to uphold the coverage denial. It is extremely difficult to demonstrate a causal connection between symptoms and conditions.142 Poly-America would have to invest a lot of effort and expense
to prove a participant or beneficiary's smoking caused his or her medical condition.
Poly-America claimed that if the court found that it could no longer
exercise discretion in applying its tobacco-related conditions exclusion, it would be forced to deny coverage to smokers altogether. A
spokesperson for Poly-America declined to disclose whether the tobacco-related conditions exclusion still exists.14 3 Other employers
may eliminate their coverage for smokers as a result of the holding in
Christianson. However, as the district court pointed out, even if PolyAmerica chooses to deny coverage to smokers altogether as a result of
the court's interpretation of the plan exclusion at issue in Christianson, such a reaction would still benefit plan participants because at
least then they would know they need to purchase additional insurance. Although employees who smoke may not feel that the need to
purchase additional insurance is a benefit, there is value in knowing
the limits of one's coverage if supplemental coverage is available. The
additional cost of supplemental health insurance for smokers may
even encourage some smokers to quit.144
The second mistake the plan made was hiring Dr. Gurkoff to review the denial. Although courts often examine benefit denials under
an abuse-of-discretion standard, previous case law has determined
that the court can nevertheless examine the quality of the evidence
the plan uses to make its decisions.145 The district court found it was
unreasonable for Poly-America to rely on Dr. Gurkoffs opinion for several reasons. First, as an oesopath and orthopedic surgeon, Dr.
Gurkoffs expertise is limited to the musculoskeletal system, and deepvein thrombosis is a disease of the vascular system. 146 Second, Dr.
142. Hoffman, supra note 114, at 695.
143. Olson, supra note 123, at 8A.
144. Although certain subgroups respond to price increases, research on the economics
of smoking behavior suggests that increasing the cost of smoking does little to
deter tobacco abuse among the general adult population, as a 12.5% decrease
would require a 50% increase in cigarette price. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Response to Increases in Cigarette
Prices by Race/Ethnicity, Income, and Age Groups-United States, 1976-1993,
47 MORBITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 605 (1998), available at ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/

pub/Publications/mmwr/wk/mm4729.pdf.
145. Phillips-Foster v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 302 F.3d 785, 798 (8th Cir. 2002).
146. Christianson,288 F. Supp. 2d at 996 n.5.
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Gurkoffs opinion merely repeated the language of the tobacco-related
conditions exclusion and offered a "bald-faced" conclusion devoid of
any explanation.147 In contrast, Christianson's treating physicians
opined that Christianson's deep-vein thrombosis was of an unknown
origin. These factors combined to lead the district court to conclude
that, even though it did not need to determine the proper standard of
review for Poly-America's decision, Christianson had a strong argument for lowering the standard of review.
This case demonstrates the danger of inadequate counsel when
dealing with ERISA law, and both sides are guilty. The district court
noted that neither party challenged the timing and admission of the
medical opinions.148 Christianson's lawyer could have pointed out
that Dr. Gurkoffs formal medical opinion was dated a month after
Poly-America sent Christianson a letter claiming that their second denial was based in part upon it. Without this opinion, Christianson
would have had an even stronger case that his deep-vein thrombosis
was not related to his tobacco abuse. Poly-America's lawyer could
have claimed that the court should not have considered Dr. Oliver or
Dr. Terzian's letters because they were not part of the administrative
record at the time Poly-America made its decision to confirm their coverage denial. Without these opinions, the court may not have been so
quick to conclude that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate
that Christianson's condition was related to his smoking.
Because Poly-America's appeal procedures did not set a deadline
after which additional materials would not be accepted or reviewed by
the plan administrator, Dr. Oliver and Dr. Terzian's letters became a
part of Christianson's administrative file. The absence of a deadline is
poor drafting on the part of the health plan. To take advantage of the
abuse-of-discretion standard of review, plans must be clear about
what documents will be considered as part of the administrative record. Because neither party in the Christianson case challenged the
admission of the medical opinions, the court regarded any objections
to the use of this information as waived: "The trial judge should not
have to assume the role of an advocate on behalf of a litigant whose
counsel has failed to assert a legal theory or argument."14 9
V.

CONCLUSION

The Christiansonfacts demonstrate how difficult it is for a plan to
exclude coverage for treatments relating to a behavior. Yet, if plans
must reduce coverage, it seems most fair that they first target illnesses resulting from voluntary, risk-taking behavior. Although
147. Id. at 997 (quoting Richardson v. Cent. States, 645 F.2d 660, 665 (8th Cir. 1981)).
148. Id. at 993 n.2.
149. Id. (citing Stafford v. Ford Motor Co., 790 F.2d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 1986)).
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ERISA permits self-insured plans to completely exclude coverage to
groups of individuals or for particular illnesses, the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of Poly-America's exclusion of tobacco-related conditions essentially makes such exclusions meaningless. If the exclusion
is worded too broadly, the court will likely hold it invalid, and if the
exclusion is worded too narrowly, the plan will find it nearly impossible to demonstrate that its decision met the requirements of the exclusion. If plan administrators cannot enforce specified exclusions to
coverage, they cannot predict and control their costs. As a result of
the holding in Christianson,plans may decide to terminate coverage
for smokers altogether. Thus, one smoker's victory may come at the
cost of coverage for smokers everywhere.
E. Kiernan McGorty

